US-China Dynamic and the Future of Collaborative Security in Regional Stability

Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Lawrence Anderson, and I'm your moderator today. I'm from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore. I'm glad to welcome you all here today because we are going to discuss a very interesting topic: the U.S.-China dynamic and the future of collaborative security in regional stability.

We have a very good panel ahead of you. But first, let me set the topic in context. The defining issue in geopolitics is the strategic competition between the United States and China. The rivalry between these two nuclear superpowers is predominant in the Asia-Pacific region, but increasingly plays out in regional security platforms and frameworks globally. Divergent state interests have led to deadlock that has paralyzed progress on pressing transboundary threats, such as climate change, cyber threats, and emerging technologies. In this uncertain international milieu, a critical question to consider is: how can nations rejuvenate existing regional security architectures to ensure their national interests?

And to answer this and other related questions, we are privileged to have four experts share their views. Let me introduce them very quickly. First, we have Mr. Jassim Mohamed El-Badawi, who is the Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). He's a distinguished diplomat with an impressive career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait. Ambassador Jassim is well qualified to be on this panel because he has held ambassadorial assignments in South Korea, NATO, the European Union, and the EU.

United States. Next, Ambassador Javier Colomina. I hope I've pronounced your name correctly. Yes, he is NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy. From 2021 to 2024, he also served as a Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia. Among his many responsibilities are strengthening dialogue and cooperation with NATO's southern partners, as well as coordinating and enhancing the visibility of NATO's efforts in their region.

Third, Mr. Luigi Di Maio is the EU Special Representative for the Gulf Region. He served in various ministerial portfolios in Italy, with his last role being Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2019 to 2022. My apologies; I should still refer to you as Minister. During your time as Foreign Minister, you chaired several G20 ministerial meetings, including the G20 Ministerial on Afghanistan and the June 2021 Plenary Ministerial Meeting of the International Anti-Daesh Coalition. Fourth, but certainly not least because he comes from the country that I come from, General Ng Park Chung, Brigadier General and Group Chief of Policy and Strategy, as well as Group Chief of Plans and Transformation in Singapore's Ministry of Defence.

An Air Force commanding officer, Brigadier General Ng has held various important command and staff appointments. Well, why don't we start off? Can I begin by inviting you, Ambassador Al-Badawi, to share your perspectives on—let me repeat the question again—how nations can rejuvenate existing regional security architectures to ensure national interests. This is the question for each of you, but we'll start with Ambassador Al-Badawi. Thank you.

Oh, yeah. Thank you. Thank you, Lawrence, for putting me on such a distinguished panel. Javier and Luigi are very good friends of mine. I feel very comfortable being with them on this stage.

My dear friend from Singapore, I welcome you. I also want to start by thanking the State of Qatar for this wonderful forum in its 22nd year, I believe. I would like to express my gratitude to the organizers of the forum for this opportunity. This is my second time speaking at this forum, and I have witnessed the great outcomes that emerge from it, including in-depth discussions and serious analytical conversations. Regarding the security structure, I can speak on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council. However, before I proceed, I must mention that I am a bit disoriented, Lawrence. In your introduction, you touched upon U.S.-China relations a little bit.

Impacting this part of the world. Yes, but do you want me to touch on both aspects or just the security structure? It's up to you.

On security structure, he made my question easier. Regarding the security structure, I can refer to March 2024 and the Gulf Cooperation Council because these six countries are addressing geopolitical changes, new aspects in our region, and international opportunities that arise, along with unfortunate threats that are emerging both regionally and internationally. The Gulf Cooperation Council introduced their vision for regional security in March 2024. In this vision, we in the GCC summarized the importance of engaging everyone regionally and internationally to ensure that this vital region is secure. We covered many aspects in that vision, and I strongly advise everyone to take a look at it.

We have invited, I think, the international community to Riyadh at the headquarters of the Gulf Cooperation Council in March. I believe it was even during Ramadan. Everyone showed up from NATO, the EU, and our friends in the P5 to listen to the Gulf's vision for security. It has many pillars, including the pillar of political dialogue, which emphasizes new, transparent political dialogue among friends and partners.

It discusses economic cooperation, energy security, maritime security, and cyber security. I’m not sure what else I may be missing—perhaps environmental challenges? In that document, we emphasize how we believe regional security should be formed, discussed, and addressed. Thank God, I am so proud to be a Gulfie from Kuwait. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been approached by many people.

Partners, countries, or regional organizations are requesting an engagement with us to discuss security, to listen to us, and to genuinely seek our partnership on various issues, with security being one of them. Recently, I would like to thank my friend Luigi Di Maio. The Gulf Cooperation Council had a summit in October of significant historical importance. Thank God they allowed me to speak before you, as I had firsthand experience in Brussels, where regional and international security were thoroughly discussed and reflected in the document. We even see eye to eye with our friends in Europe on this matter. With these developments, Lawrence stated that multilateralism must be our way forward.

We cannot live in a world divided. We cannot live in these polarized societies. We need to continue engagement. We need to continue dialogue. We need to continue holding countries or organizations accountable.

We need to make sure that they are responsible and accountable. We need to ensure that this wonderful UN Charter is implemented and also improved. I will end here and leave it to your questions. Thank you. Well, thank you very much. You've provided a good overview of the way the Gulf Cooperation Council sees the future as a platform to engage these issues. I suppose there’s one angle from which we can view it: there’s the EU, the NATO aspect, and then how we handle things in the Asia-Pacific. I think it would be helpful to consider how the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China is influencing your perspectives in your respective parts of the world. From that angle, may I invite Ambassador Kolomina to present your views now? Yes, thank you very much, Lawrence, and thanks very much to the Doha Forum for having us. It's a pleasure to share this panel with a couple of very good friends, Jasim and Luigi, and it’s a pleasure to meet you as well.

So, a couple of comments. You mentioned geostrategic competition and referred to the U.S. and China, but I'd like to stress that in our view, we do live in a world of geostrategic competition that is not solely defined by the relationship between the U.S. and China. There are other actors that play a role in this competition, particularly the role of Russia, which is very relevant for us. The way they have been handling their own war of aggression against Ukraine and their general role in the context of geostrategic competition is significant. In that same context of geostrategic competition, I would like to emphasize the importance of the Global South and how it should be leveraged as we work together to achieve our common goals, which are stability and peace. The Secretary-General of the GCC mentioned these goals.

We all have in mind the goals of stability and peace. The Secretary General of the GCC mentioned these goals. I am the Special Representative for NATO for the entire Southern Neighborhood, which includes both the Mediterranean and the Gulf. We have formats to work with the Mediterranean and platforms to work with the Gulf. I believe this is a way to ultimately collaborate in a manner that allows us to distance ourselves from the existing strategic competition. However, we also recognize the necessity for cooperation.

The second comment I’ll make is about the interconnectivity of challenges and threats that we see today. There are many examples of this. One clear link between the Indo-Pacific and the Atlantic regions is the presence of North Korean soldiers in Ukraine. However, there are many other interconnections. For instance, Iran's support for Russia's war against Ukraine is another example. Additionally, you could mention many connections observable in the unfolding events in Syria and the broader security implications.

What's the answer to all the turmoil and instability that we are seeing? In our view, and in my personal conviction, it ultimately lies in regional multilateral efforts. These efforts respond better to situations of instability like the ones we are experiencing today. Of course, NATO is a regional political and military alliance—an impressive one, as everybody knows—and it has been able to maintain stability and peace in the Atlantic area for 75 years. It serves as a good example of what multilateral efforts can achieve. We are also trying to work multilaterally with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Gulf and with the African Union on the African continent.

We believe that an answer to the situation we are all witnessing should be formulated. In my opinion, after almost five years as a diplomat, this is the most difficult and unstable period we have faced. The European Union, with which we work very closely—hand in hand—in many aspects of the Euro-Atlantic area, in Ukraine, and with many other partners, is key to this response. We need to adopt a collaborative approach to address the challenges and threats we see. Therefore, we should definitely strive to reinvigorate multilateral platforms as a response to the current situation. Thank you.

Thanks. Well, thank you very much. You know, you're absolutely right. I suppose, for people in NATO and especially in Europe, your main concern would be what's happening between Russia and Ukraine and around that region. I can only plead, and this is not a very good reason, the title was not something I created, but it was given to us from that angle.

But thank you very much for expanding on it and focusing on what NATO is about. Since it's about NATO and Europe, perhaps we can continue with that. With Minister Di Miel. So, could you... Thank you very much. It's very difficult to speak after Jassim and Javier.

And thank you for the invitation. It's a great pleasure, General. It's a pleasure to see you. I would like to add a few things to what Jassim and Javier have already said about this issue. More than two years ago, I was still the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

We decided to consider what Jasmine and Javier already said about this issue. More than two years ago, I was still the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We decided to approve the European Union's new strategy for the region, with the awareness we already had at the time, which was growing more and more. It was very clear that the security of this region is our security in Europe, and I would say vice versa. This is why we started a new kind of approach, aiming to avoid some mistakes from the past and trying to work on the same level with a new level of engagement, in order to create a strategic partnership between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the European Union. The summit mentioned by the Secretary General of the GCC, Jassim Abouda, is one of the most important milestones on this path of more than two years, where our leaders at the highest level decided to elevate our collaboration to a strategic level for peace and security, and for peace and prosperity. This is something that is not merely written; it is a commitment.

During the last year, we activated new structured dialogue and channels of cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as the European Union. Since January of this year, the European Union and the GCC have engaged in a structured security dialogue at the senior officials' level on cybersecurity, maritime security, disaster preparedness, and counter-terrorism. We have a high-level forum under Chatham House rules for the ministers of foreign affairs, where they can discuss matters in a conducive environment, free from the spotlight. This allows for discussions on security cooperation and other issues. Furthermore, we have increasingly collaborated to address challenges not only in the region but also beyond. The partners of the GCC are indispensable to us in various contexts, including conflicts like the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The roles of many GCC countries have been fundamental in efforts such as the return of children to Russia, the exchange of prisoners, and support for humanitarian cooperation. As we look toward 2024, it becomes clear how interconnected and interrelated the two regions are.

If we look toward 2025, we have many challenges ahead of us. First of all, on the multilateral side, we must consider the competition with China. Of course, the European Union is the strongest ally of the United States, and together with NATO, we have stood in solidarity during the last two years with Ukraine. At the same time, as the new High Representative for Foreign Policy and Defense Policy of the European Union, Josep Borrell, stated during a hearing in the European Parliament, China is increasingly becoming a competitor, even a systemic rival. However, this does not mean that on multilateral issues, we do not want to cooperate with China in order to de-escalate conflicts and avoid further tensions. This applies to Ukraine as well; many times, our leaders in Europe and even representatives of the European Union have called on China to convey messages to Russia and President Putin, urging them to stop this aggression.

But it's the same with the equation of security in the region, where we know that China facilitated some dialogue between GCC countries and regional actors like Iran. We even call on China regarding Yemen, for instance, to convey messages to the Houthis and to stop the attacks against our commercial vessels in the Red Sea. I think that the summit was a milestone between you and the GCC. Now our challenge is the implementation, and it's not only about security, but also about security in a more restrictive sense.

Security means connecting our markets more closely through free trade agreements. Security also involves creating stronger connections between our people through the visa liberalization process. We have many goals ahead of us, and we are fortunate to have a counterpart like Jacim Abudaiwi, who knows the European Union better than I do and has served six years in Brussels. He understands this complicated machine, which is, in any case, a great machine in Brussels. Thank you very much, and thank you, Luigi, for bringing in this perspective regarding China and others. This is essential not only for what is happening in Europe but also for the situation here in the Middle East. You have highlighted an important aspect: it’s not just about rivalry and cooperation.

And this is the distinguishing feature, I think, about the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China nowadays. It's not quite the same, although people and writers have described it as a new Cold War. There is a distinct difference between the current situation and what existed in the past between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In the past, it was about two different systems, but now we are all in one system. So it doesn't matter that the EU is closely allied with NATO and the United States; countries still want to maintain good relations with China. In order to resolve geopolitical tensions and rivalries—whether in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia—we need more cooperation between the U.S. and China rather than conflict between the two.

And so with that, and taking on what Javier was saying, in Europe, the focus with NATO is on Russia and Ukraine. In our part of the world, in Asia, specifically in the Asia-Pacific region, the emphasis is more on the U.S.-China strategic rivalry. Here, I would like to turn the discussion over to General Ng to provide the Asian perspective. Thank you. Thank you, Lawrence, for the introduction, and thank you to the Doha Forum for the opportunity to speak with this distinguished panel.

I think, while I come from Singapore, I would like to respond to Lawrence's question by providing some perspective from the ASEAN viewpoint. ASEAN, for colleagues who may not know, stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It consists of ten countries with diverse backgrounds and cultures; however, as an organization, we have managed to stick together as a regional architecture to address influences both within and outside the region. When we consider U.S.-China engagement, whether it is in a rivalrous or cooperative sense, it is important to acknowledge that, for us, it is a reality that China is in the neighborhood, and the U.S. is also present. For ASEAN, we have always believed that the region is large enough for different players to contribute to peace and security. If we reflect on the regional security architecture and its beginnings within ASEAN, the focus initially emerged from the ASEAN Regional Forum, which was established shortly after the Cold War.

It is still the organization in the world, from a regional security architecture perspective, that boasts countries as diverse as the US, China, Russia, and North Korea. So every time we have an ARF-related security conference that takes place, I have the opportunity to sit next to Russian colleagues, going by alphabetical order at the round table. There will be representatives from different countries that have come and gone, maintaining friendly relations and sometimes experiencing tense relationships with each other. But ASEAN has provided the platform for these different countries to come together, including partners from the EU as well.

We have invited our friends from near and far, as well as partners from the EU. We encouraged our friends from all corners of the world to come to the table and engage in conversations that aim to promote peace. I have described the ASEAN Regional Forum that began in the mid-'90s. Additionally, there is the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus platform that started around 2006, followed by developments in the early 2010s. The distinction between this platform and the ASEAN Regional Forum lies in its composition: it includes the original ten ASEAN member states along with extra-regional partners, namely the United States, China, and Russia. The main objective of this platform is to facilitate security-level discussions among these key countries. We have seen instances where the members of ADMM-Plus have collaborated on practical cooperation, uniting the 18 member states for this purpose.

And we believe that it is important to have a platform for practical cooperation, and the ADMM Plus offers that platform for different countries with various perspectives to come together. Given the current stage where we are very concerned about US-China strategic rivalry, it is all the more important that we continue to have platforms where different countries can unite and engage in meaningful conversations. A lot of this, as we all know, happens on the sidelines; however, having a platform for countries to come together, contribute, and then continue these discussions on the sidelines is crucial for ASEAN. This is something we want to see continuing as we move forward. Thank you.

Thank you, General Ong. And thank you also for bringing in the aspect of ASEAN because that is a very distinct way in which I think the ASEAN and its platforms—whether it's the ARF, the ADMM, or ADMM+, or the East Asia Summit—differ from the way the Gulf Cooperation Council works and also from the way NATO and the EU work. In the sense that we are not an alliance like NATO; we are more inclusive because we feel that if you want to solve the problems of the world, whether it is the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, or whether you want to address transnational issues—what we call non-traditional security issues, such as climate change, the pandemic, global supply chains, and cybersecurity—you have to engage everybody. This is essential to building cooperation and sharing the ownership of how to resolve these issues. On the question of what we call the rules-based order, we must consider how to minimize the potential for conflict while respecting the principles and rules governing international relations as embodied in the U.N. Charter.

So that's a critical area that we are all looking at, even as we discuss the U.S.-China strategic rivalry in our part of the world. Having said that, perhaps I can continue with you, General Eng, by raising this issue. With the significant changes and the introduction of a new element into the equation following the U.S. elections, and with President-elect Trump beginning his second term in office, how do you see this impacting the U.S.-China rivalry in the Asia-Pacific? Do you anticipate any new changes or dynamics, or are we more likely to see an intensification of U.S.-China competition in the Asia-Pacific? Thanks, Lawrence, for posing a question that requires me to really gaze into the crystal ball, which is quite challenging to address.

But I'll share with you conversations that I had with American friends as well as Chinese friends during my recent visit there. I recently visited Beijing just before the election results were announced. I asked my Chinese friends, "What are you worried about? Are you worried about U.S.-China relations?" The response that came back to me was, "Not really."

If we want to think about future scenarios, the trajectory, whether it was Harris or Trump, is likely to be very much the same. There's going to be a sense of rivalry that will continue, a sense of competition that will persist. For the Chinese friends I spoke to, they were very concerned about the economic recovery happening amidst the rivalry with China because their expectation is that, regardless of the administration, things will remain pretty much the same. I asked the same question of American friends, and, of course, from different parts of the aisle, the answer was pretty much the same.

I asked the same question of American friends. And of course, from different parts of the aisle, the answer is also quite similar. Both Democrats and Republicans have a certain view of the relationship with China, and whether you talk about how high the fence is or how wide the yard is, the recognition is that it is a relationship of competition that will continue regardless of the administration in power. I think the context of a new administration brings with it certain uncertainties, because there is concern about a lack of continuity that will present itself in that administration. However, the realities of how the U.S. and China see themselves across the aisle, and also from the Chinese perspective, bring forward a certain sense of stability. In that sense, it will be a rivalrous relationship moving forward. However, the nuances of that rivalry will depend on the recognition of the unpredictability that comes with a new administration. With that unpredictability, I think there are both positive and negative aspects. On the negative side, there is a lot of fear, especially given recent pronouncements of tariffs, that there will be an acceleration of the competitive nature that will emerge.

But we also recognize from the unpredictability that if both sides can find areas of cooperation, and if both sides can find areas where deals can be struck, you may never know how things will move. I think ultimately, from the new administration, it seems like it is very much based on what is in the U.S. interest. Of course, I am very sure that the Chinese will be thinking about what is in China's interest. Given that this is the second time that the Trump administration has engaged with ASEAN, I think opportunities for collaboration are important. This is what ASEAN, as a region, is looking forward to, as both the U.S. and China are very important partners. We would rather they get along well than fight with each other. The proverbial elephants versus ants on the ground is something that we in ASEAN feel very strongly about.

So, we hope that the two elephants will get along with each other. Thank you very much. Your crystal ball is certainly working in terms of being clearer regarding what we see, but it's also expressing the hope we have that the U.S. and China can perhaps, well, compete, but also learn how to work together and cooperate. That was the trend in the immediate aftermath of the old Cold War. Now, let me move back, and I'm going in reverse order from the way the discussion started.

So now let me move into the European theater, both in the EU and in NATO. But first, if I could ask Minister Miao, we have an incoming administration that is also dealing with a strategic rivalry between the US and China. At the same time, the EU and NATO are faced with challenges regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. Alongside this, there is a very new trade policy with China that may come under stress due to the rivalry between the US and China. Additionally, the EU has demonstrated strong support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia.

But we know that the U.S. administration, the incoming administration, is likely going to put more pressure on the EU and on the Europeans to contribute more to the war effort. With all these competing interests, how effective will the EU be in addressing these multiple challenges? Thank you for the question. I have to say that we have been in a period of multiple challenges for many years, and with the latest developments from Syria, it seems that these challenges are not going to stop or decrease. When we discuss the main rivalry, U.S.-China, we should also consider the lessons learned during the COVID pandemic. This period has provided many insights for the European Union regarding its relationship with China. It's not necessarily about being against China; rather, it's about understanding our resilience and our supply chain systems. When Russian aggression against Ukraine emerged, it taught us another important lesson—not just about masks or vaccines, but also about energy, gas, and related issues. The key word for the European Union in facing this multipolar world is "diversification." If we can diversify our sources in terms of energy, critical supply chains, and raw materials, then we will be in a much better position to define our foreign and defense policy in a focused manner.

Obviously, around the world, there are those who hope to decouple the European Union and the United States in order to break this alliance, but this is impossible. We refer to it as an alliance of values. Our markets, people, and institutions have been connected for centuries. It is very important to emphasize that while the European Union has its own autonomous strategic foreign policy, when it comes to the main challenges at the multilateral and global levels, we prefer to work first with our allies and partners. As I mentioned in my first intervention, we also look to those strategic actors on the multilateral side who are capable of cooperating with us to help de-escalate certain scenarios and address various issues. Regarding the diversification process, we are very committed not only to establishing bilateral relations with certain countries or organizations as the European Union but also to creating new pathways and corridors, for instance.

I'm very proud that Europeans have united. Some member states of the European Union and European institutions signed, almost two years ago, an agreement with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and India regarding the India-Middle East Economic Corridor. This is another step in the direction of diversification. We see what is happening in the Red Sea. If we are able to create not alternative corridors, but complementary corridors for goods, data, and energy, we will be able to face this new world, which is very polarized and increasingly unpredictable compared to the past. I feel that this region, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as a regional organization, and the GCC countries, are increasingly implementing a multipolar foreign policy with a strategic and autonomous vision of their foreign policy. Even when I was Minister of Foreign Affairs, I often engaged with my counterparts here in the Gulf to address multilateral challenges and to implement processes at the United Nations. We also worked on resolving bilateral issues with countries or entities around the world that we were unable to engage with due to historical reasons and very poor bilateral relations. So, I see potential in this world of diversification. Along the path of diversification for the European Union, having strategic partners like the GCC countries is, of course, a blessing. Thank you very much.

And I'd like to maybe go back to you also, Luigi, but I think I'd like to bring Javier into the discussion. Thank you very much. It's a question now between what's going to happen in the European theater of operations before we come to the Middle East part. So I'd like to ask you, given the sort of challenges that are taking place in the European theater, and with talk of a peace plan by President Trump and his special representative, General Kellogg, being brought into the equation, what role do you see NATO playing as it tries to accommodate shifting U.S. interests amidst the war in Ukraine?

But also, there is the question of whether you ask the Ukrainian president about ammunition, support, and all that to combat the situation in his country. Additionally, there is the issue of the plan which involves the proposal that he must basically accept ceding certain amounts of territory to Russia. Can we inquire about NATO's viewpoint from a military aspect, as well as the EU's response from other perspectives? Shall we say, do you see light at the end of the tunnel regarding what has been reported about the American peace plan? What would be the EU and NATO's viewpoint on how they would like to see the cessation of fighting between Russia and Ukraine? Thank you very much.

So I want to get into what the new U.S. administration is going to do. The Secretary General was the first European leader to travel to Mar-a-Lago and had a very fruitful and constructive conversation with President-elect Trump. What I can say is that we have always seen the light at the end of the tunnel. The light at the end of the tunnel in the war in Ukraine is quite clear: it's just the Russians withdrawing their troops.

It's as easy as that. They decided to invade a free country. They decided to violate the UN Charter. They decided to violate all the principles that we uphold. And we have been asking them to do the reverse: to withdraw the troops.

What would be the impact of the new U.S. administration in the U.S. Atlantic area? There will be an impact. There is always an impact from any new U.S. administration, and I cannot elaborate on how Trump will be impacting it. We've heard things from the campaign, but as we all know, politicians say a lot of things during the campaign, and in the end, we need to see the real policies. What I can foresee is that Europeans will definitely need to continue to invest in defense.

This famous 2% will probably need to be overcome with a larger figure. Europeans will need to do this in order to continue supporting Ukraine, as well as to strengthen our collective defense. Right now, I think both the European Union and NATO have been very clear about their priorities: to continue supporting Ukraine and to give the Ukrainians the best possible chance on the battlefield. This situation is not looking very promising lately, either in terms of negotiations or outcomes, but it is for them to decide how they react to that.

Then we'll see how the months ahead will unfold. Regarding that particular scenario, I’d like to add a couple of comments on the China-U.S. competition that you mentioned, building on some of the things I have already heard. First, I want to emphasize that we are a political alliance—a political and military alliance—but every single decision made by the alliance I represent is taken by civilians. Our military colleagues only execute our decisions.

All of the stakeholders and decision-makers in my house are civilians, just as I am, just as Mark Rutter, just as any other person you might know. Military personnel are only there to execute orders. Second, we are a defensive alliance. We are prepared to deter threats in order to maintain peace and stability. The formula, which you may like or dislike, is the only successful one I have seen that has maintained stability and peace for 75 years in a broader area like the Euro-Atlantic region.

In that competition, I do believe, as Luigi was saying, that the world is moving into a logic of national interest, focusing on multi-vector foreign policies rather than a block logic. I don't think we will be advancing in that direction, regardless of the specific competition between the Americans and the Chinese, which certainly involves national interests on both sides and considerations of hegemony. At NATO, we have a very different policy regarding how we perceive Russia. As I mentioned before, we view Russia as an invader, an aggressor, and a threat to us. In contrast, our perspective on China is more nuanced; we have a sophisticated policy toward China. We do not consider China an adversary; rather, we see it as a competitor and a systemic challenge, but we also engage with them.

We talk with them very often. I tell them very openly, "Why did you decide to enable the war of aggression of Russia against Ukraine? Why did you decide to take these actions? Why are you actually providing so many items, like microelectronics or dual-capable equipment, to the Russians?"

It's as open as I'm saying, and the Chinese are very open, often refusing the accusations. We are just focusing on political and military aspects. We don't have economic and trade relations with the country. However, we understand that many of my allies cooperate and trade with China. We're not aiming for a block logic.

We believe that there is a national interest and a multi-vector foreign policy logic. In that sense, the way we cooperate with every single nation that wants to collaborate with us is important. In the South, for instance, we cooperate with countries from Mauritania to Egypt to Jordan and the Gulf countries. We must identify where our interests align. It doesn't matter that some of those countries may cooperate with China or even with Russia the day before or the day after. I may not like their close ties with Russia, but I understand that it is merely a matter of foreign policy.

You have to take your time making your own decisions. However, there is an interest among all of us to try to cooperate as much as possible, using the space that exists to ultimately foster stability and promote peace. This is something we are trying to do with our Gulf partners—four of them, excluding Oman and Saudi Arabia, countries that we also work with, but they are not partners of NATO. The Secretary General of the GCC, Luigi, knows the European Union well; he also knows NATO well because he served as the ambassador to both the European Union and NATO for six years, and he is a very good friend. Therefore, we need to continue to cooperate in that spirit. I believe we should try to avoid the confrontational logic that stems from the bloc perspectives that prevailed during the Cold War. We need to move toward a completely different concept, especially considering how much instability and how many wars we are facing.

Today, there are two wars: one in the Atlantic area and one in the Middle East. There is enormous concern arising from both conflicts, and significant investments are being made by all my allies in each region. We must work together to advance stability and peace. Thank you.

But I'd like to follow up on what you've said, because from day one, I think the feeling was that China could do more in terms of pressing or talking to the Russians regarding this issue, and that you are continuing to engage the Chinese on this. Can I ask whether you have noticed any change, or at least any change either way, in how the Chinese have responded? Secondly, you mentioned that the Chinese have provided the Russians with dual-use technologies, but has there been any evidence that they have actually provided military weapons to the Chinese, like the way the Iranians have been providing to the Russians? Or that the North Koreans have now entered a phase where we have lots of evidence of dual-use equipment? We don't have evidence on military equipment, and that's why I said dual-use equipment, such as electronics and many other things. We have been conveying that to our Chinese friends over and over from the very beginning.

But unfortunately, not only did we not see a change in their behavior, but I also believe that an essential actor in everything that happens in the world is a permanent member of the Security Council, and nuclear power should, in our view, be a more responsible actor. There is no doubt that it is an influential actor in Moscow. From the beginning, we conveyed those messages, but as I said, not only did we not see a change, but in the last year, they moved from being somewhat passive to becoming an active, decisive enabler in the world. As I mentioned, I want to be clear on this: they are involved through industries that provide dual-use equipment. Approximately 90% of the microelectronics come from them, and of course, we have data showing this. They know very well what they're doing; they are very serious people, even if sometimes we don't agree with their actions. It’s crucial to emphasize that the policy we have in NATO is a policy agreed upon by 32 countries, where the U.S. is just one of those 32 nations.

And then we were able to preserve that very strong engagement track with China, which allows us to convey messages. Sometimes, it's difficult conversations, usually very long. But we delve into every one of the topics that are of mutual interest. Thank you very much. Now, I’d like to come to an area that is very close to my heart because I spent six and a half years in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain as the Singapore ambassador there.

So can I ask you, Ambassador Bouddhawe, what do you see as the prospects for regional peace and dialogue in the Middle East, given the contrasting interests not only of the two superpowers we are discussing, the U.S. and China, but also of other major regional actors? What is your prognosis in terms of the prospects for peace, considering there are multiple theatres here, not only in Gaza but also in Lebanon and now in Syria? Thank you, Lawrence. I want to go back to the discussion on... not only in Gaza but also in Lebanon and now in Syria.

Thank you, Lawrence. I want to go back to the intervention and discuss the general talk a bit about the Asian GCC. We had our first summit last year in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and our next summit is going to be in 2025, in May, I believe, in Malaysia. We value our relationship greatly with our friends in ASEAN, and we are looking forward to enhancing this relationship even further. There is also the possibility of Chinese participation, going back to your question about the China-U.S.-Gulf relationship. The Chinese president will be present at the summit, so the GCC-China relationship is moving forward seriously and on the right track. Again, I take pride in being from the Gulf, where everyone is looking at us as a true and reliable partner. Another comment I want to make concerns the security structure. You mentioned the possibility of having a security dialogue in the region. You cannot establish or formulate any security structure without resolving the existing issues. How can we talk about security structures or plans while Israel is killing Palestinians on a daily basis? What is the basis for that dialogue? If we want to broaden this discussion, the continuous barbaric, inhumane acts by Israel in Palestine need to stop in order for us to find a solution for the Palestinian people, rebuild Gaza, and give them hope.

Of a country, and then we can discuss other issues in the region. How can you have a security structure while the Houthis are endangering and attacking Bab al-Wadab and the Red Sea on an almost daily basis? That is something we need to address. We need the international community to take its responsibility. We need the Security Council to play its role.

We need to implement the UN Charter in order to truly solve everything in our region through dialogue with other partners. Here in Doha, on October 3rd, we held our first joint ministerial meeting between the GCC and Iran, where both sides engaged in frank and transparent discussions about the future relationship between them. We explored how this can be reflected in, and truly affect, peace and stability in the region. We were all very happy and jubilant to see the normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023. As I mentioned before, dialogue is essential. It has to be a regional and international responsibility, involving us and China as well. Once again, I would like to reiterate that we maintain a balanced stance with respect to both China and the US. Each relationship has its own track and does not affect the other.

Our engagement with this is at the highest level. In July 2022, we had the GCC-US Summit in Jeddah, and in December 2022, we had our first-ever GCC-China Summit in Riyadh. If I read the file to you, we would stay here until the evening discussing the amount of cooperation we have at every different level with both sides. We don't view it as contradictory; no, we think they complete each other. To add to the general's comment, we truly need a relationship between the US and China.

Humanity needs it. Earth needs it. The environment, economy, politics, and military security all depend on it. It is an essential relationship. We need a normal relationship between China and the United States for the world to function properly.

Thank you. Well, I think what you have said, Ambassador, is something that all of us will agree on: we need cooperation between the two superpowers. Based on my 37 years in the Foreign Ministry and dealing with many of these issues, I believe that's a good approach. The hope has always been that we can try to resolve these issues, but when it comes to regional security and competition, we find it almost impossible to reach a solution. At best, we can aim to manage these conflicts and differences in a way that prevents the outbreak of war, if possible, while simultaneously working towards cooperation, maintaining peace and stability, and ensuring the prosperity of our peoples.

That's about, I think, about as best as we can hope. A lot of it will deal with, you know, building confidence and trust, and in this case, hopefully, working together to help build confidence and trust between the U.S. and China, but also within the Middle East and Europe on the issues of moving forward. But you need deterrence, and you need diplomacy. These two need to come into play. So I'd like to ask you, in this equation, what would you like to see coming from the U.S. and China towards building on the situation, the conflicts in the Middle East, especially between North Korea and Gaza, between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and the move towards the idea of a two-state solution? Additionally, what about the question of Lebanon and Israel, while also addressing the elephant in the room that we haven't really talked about: Iran?

I addressed Iran, and I think your colleague is looking at me. I think she wants us to end. Well, I'll try to be as brief as possible. I believe your question has two tracks for answering. The first track is the multilateral track, meaning the duties of the United States and China through the Security Council as permanent members. This has been a paralyzed machine that really needs to move forward. They need to find common ground.

They need to think about the whole situation. They need to consider how their differences might impact regional and international peace and security. This is one responsibility for them. The other responsibility is their continued engagement with the region.

They both have excellent relationships with everybody. Everyone is willing to discuss matters with them, whether it's the Gulf countries, and that is extremely obvious. We have open-door policies with both of them, but I'm also talking about the other players and parts of the world, for example, the Arab League, Turkey, or, I don’t know, other players in the region like Iran. This is another track where they need to engage and ensure that some sort of dialogue gets initiated in order for us to say we truly have something we can build on. We all saw what happened with the JCPOA and how much time, money, and effort were invested in it. We thought we might have some sort of monitoring mechanism that would assure us of the status of Iran's nuclear program, but we don’t have that anymore.

Everybody is vague. We have to trust the IAEA to see what is truly happening in Iran in that aspect. So, I think it's two tracks: they have to fulfill their responsibilities through the UN and the Security Council, as well as through their bilateral relationships. Yes.

Thank you very much. I must apologize to the audience because I haven't been a good moderator. I’m supposed to keep track of the time, but I haven't done that. Thank you very much for your patience. May I ask whether I can open the floor to at least one question from the audience? Just a quick question, okay? Yes, I know we started late, but just one question— a quick question, alright? Sure, let's go with just one question.

Yeah. Okay. Okay. I even shut off my...